DMARC Reports: Read Them, Then Enforce
No, the rua tag is not required for a DMARC record to work, but you should add it anyway, because the reports it sends are how you find every service using your domain before you turn on enforcement.
This post is for owners who already have a DMARC record sitting at p=none and don't know what to do next. You'll learn what the reports contain, how to read them without being an email expert, and a step-by-step plan to move from none to quarantine to reject without blocking your own invoices and newsletters.
What DMARC is, in plain English
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is a DNS record that tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that claims to come from your domain but fails authentication. It builds on two older checks:
- SPF (Sender Policy Framework): a list of servers allowed to send mail for your domain.
- DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail): a digital signature added to each message that proves it wasn't altered and came from a domain that holds the key.
DMARC passes when SPF or DKIM passes and the domain it checked matches the domain in the visible "From" address. That match is called alignment. The full rules are in RFC 7489.
Your DMARC policy (the p= value) is the instruction. At p=none, receivers deliver failing mail normally. You get visibility but no protection from spoofing. That is why staying at none forever is a half-finished job.
Is rua required in a DMARC record?
No. A minimal valid record is just v=DMARC1; p=none. But without rua you receive no aggregate reports, so you are flying blind. Enforcing without them is how people accidentally block their own mail.
The rua tag is the address where receivers send daily summary reports. A typical record, published as a TXT record at the host _dmarc, looks like this:
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com
Two practical notes:
- Use a dedicated mailbox. Reports arrive as automated attachments and can be noisy.
- If the report address is on a different domain than the one you are protecting, that other domain must publish a permission record. Otherwise many receivers won't send reports. The format is
example.com._report._dmarc.reportdomain.comas a TXT record with the valuev=DMARC1. The mechanism is described in RFC 7489, section 7.1.
Check what you have published with:
dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
You can also run your domain through our email spoofing checker to see whether it is easy to forge.
What the rua reports actually show
Aggregate reports are XML files, usually zipped or gzipped, sent about once a day by each large mailbox provider. They contain no message content. They are a tally of mail that claimed to be from your domain.
The parts that matter:
- source_ip: the server that sent the mail.
- count: how many messages came from it.
- disposition: what the receiver did (
none,quarantineorreject). - dkim / spf under
policy_evaluated: whether each check passed and aligned. - header_from: the domain shown in the From address.
A trimmed example (the IP is from a reserved documentation range):
<record>
<row>
<source_ip>203.0.113.25</source_ip>
<count>412</count>
<policy_evaluated>
<disposition>none</disposition>
<dkim>fail</dkim>
<spf>fail</spf>
</policy_evaluated>
</row>
<identifiers>
<header_from>example.com</header_from>
</identifiers>
</record>
This says 412 messages from one IP failed both checks. Either it is a legitimate tool you haven't set up properly, or someone is spoofing you. Your job is to find out which.
How to read a DMARC report without going cross-eyed
Raw XML is painful. Paste a file into a free viewer or send your rua address to a DMARC reporting service. Several vendors offer free tiers or free weekly digests, and they turn the XML into a table of sender, volume and pass/fail. Pick one whose pricing and data handling you are comfortable with.
Then sort by volume and ask one question about each source: do I recognize this?
| What you see | What it usually means | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| DKIM and SPF pass, aligned | Healthy sender | Nothing |
| Known service, DKIM pass, SPF fail | Fine. DMARC needs only one aligned pass | Optional cleanup |
| Known service, both fail | The service sends as you but isn't set up | Add its DKIM and SPF records (see below) |
| Unknown IP, small volume, both fail | Probably spoofing or forwarded mail | Watch, don't panic |
| Unknown IP, large volume, both fail | Forgotten tool or active abuse | Investigate before enforcing |
Forwarding is a common source of confusion. When someone auto-forwards your email, SPF often breaks, but a DKIM signature usually survives. That is why strong DKIM matters.
Step 1: Inventory everything that sends as your domain
List every source from your reports for at least two weeks. Include the ones people forget:
- Your main mailbox (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho)
- Your website's contact form and WordPress mail plugin
- Newsletter tools (Mailchimp, Brevo and similar)
- Store and billing systems (Shopify, Stripe receipts, invoicing apps)
- Help desk and CRM tools
Stay at p=none for a full business cycle, ideally a month, so monthly invoices and seasonal campaigns show up.
Step 2: Fix each legitimate sender
For every real service that fails, log in to its email or domain settings and look for "authenticate your domain," "custom sending domain" or "DKIM." The service will give you DNS records to publish. Adding DKIM is the most reliable fix because it survives forwarding.
For SPF, keep one SPF record per domain. Merge senders into a single line, for example:
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net ~all
SPF allows a maximum of 10 DNS lookups, so don't keep adding include: entries for tools you no longer use. For WordPress, route site mail through a real mail service using a plugin such as WP Mail SMTP instead of the server's default mail function.
Step 3: Move to quarantine gradually
quarantine asks receivers to treat failing mail as suspicious, usually by sending it to spam. The pct tag applies the policy to only a percentage of failing mail, so mistakes are contained.
- Publish
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com - Wait a week. Read the reports and ask staff and customers whether anything went missing.
- Raise to
pct=25, then50, then removepct(which means 100). - If a legitimate sender shows up failing, fix it first, then continue.
DNS changes can take time to propagate, so lower the TTL (time-to-live) on the record to 300 seconds before you start. That lets you roll back quickly.
Step 4: Move to reject
reject tells receivers to refuse failing mail outright. It is the setting that actually stops most spoofing of your exact domain. Use the same gradual approach:
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=10; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com
Watch for a week, then step up to 100%. Keep rua in place permanently, because new tools get added and old ones change.
Here is how the three policies compare:
| Policy | Receiver action on failing mail | Spoofing protection | Risk to your real mail |
|---|---|---|---|
p=none | Delivers normally, sends you reports | None | None |
p=quarantine | Usually spam folder | Partial | Low, mail is recoverable |
p=reject | Refused | Strongest | Higher if senders are missed |
Don't forget subdomains and parked domains
A policy at the top domain also covers subdomains unless you set sp=. If a domain never sends email, protect it directly:
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com
Pair it with an SPF record of v=spf1 -all, which says no server may send for that domain.
Before you flip each switch: a checklist
- [ ] Reports have been collected for at least two weeks, ideally a month
- [ ] Every legitimate sender passes DKIM or SPF with alignment
- [ ] Only one SPF record exists, under 10 lookups
- [ ] Someone checked that invoices, password resets and contact-form mail still arrive
- [ ] TTL is low so you can roll back fast
Why bother
Major mailbox providers now expect authentication. Google's sender guidelines require a DMARC record for bulk senders. The US government went further: CISA's BOD 18-01 required federal agencies to move to p=reject. Small businesses don't face that rule, but the logic holds. An enforced policy makes it much harder for someone to send fake invoices that look like they come from you, and it helps with client security questionnaires.
Email is one piece of the picture. If you want to know what else a stranger could find, read our guide on whether your website is hackable.
Key takeaways
ruais optional for DMARC to function, but it is the only way to see who sends mail as your domain. Add it.- Read reports by volume. Fix the legitimate senders that fail, and investigate the unknown ones.
- Move in stages:
none, thenquarantinewith a risingpct, thenrejectwith a risingpct. Wait about a week at each step. - Prefer DKIM for every sender, because it survives forwarding.
- Keep
ruaon after you reachreject, and publishp=rejectplusv=spf1 -allon domains that never send mail.
Where a human audit fits
DMARC protects your email identity, but your website, logins and plugins matter just as much. Start with our free website security check. If you want a person to go through the whole site by hand and write up every issue with exact fixes, the Circuit audit is $49 one-time. See pricing for details. It is a focused small-site audit, not an enterprise penetration test or a compliance certification.
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