Domain Hijacking: How to Prevent It
Domain hijacking is when someone takes control of your domain name at the registrar (the company where you registered it), and you prevent it by locking the domain, protecting the registrar account with strong two-factor login, using a locked-down login email, and keeping auto-renew on.
This guide is for owners of small sites, online stores and agency-managed domains who do not want to lose their name. You will get a short comparison of the look-alike attacks, a registrar checklist you can finish in about 20 minutes, and a plan for the first hour if your domain is stolen.
What is domain hijacking?
Your domain (like yourshop.com) is rented from a registrar such as GoDaddy, Namecheap or Squarespace Domains. The registrar account decides where the domain points and who owns it. Whoever controls that account controls the domain.
In domain hijacking, an attacker gets that control without your permission. They can then:
- Point your site at their own server, or a fake copy of it.
- Redirect your email, so they receive password-reset messages meant for you.
- Transfer the domain to another registrar, or sell it.
The usual routes are not movie-style hacking. They are a reused password, a phished login, a hijacked email inbox, a tricked support agent, or a domain that was allowed to expire. This is why the same advice applies whether your domain sits at GoDaddy or anywhere else. A hijack at GoDaddy or any other registrar starts the same way: someone gets into the account or talks their way past support.
Domain hijacking vs DNS hijacking, DNS poisoning and typosquatting
These terms get mixed up. They attack different layers. DNS (the Domain Name System) is the internet's address book. It turns yourshop.com into the server address a browser needs.
| Attack | What the attacker does | Where it happens | Main defence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Domain hijacking | Takes over the domain registration itself | Your registrar account | Registrar lock, 2FA, locked-down login email, auto-renew |
| DNS hijacking | Changes your DNS records or nameservers so visitors go elsewhere | Your DNS host, registrar or router | Strong logins on DNS and registrar, change alerts |
| DNS poisoning (cache poisoning) | Feeds fake answers into a DNS resolver's memory so some users get a wrong address | A DNS resolver, not your account | Up-to-date resolvers, DNSSEC |
| Typosquatting | Registers a look-alike name such as yourshopp.com | Their own domain, not yours | Brand monitoring, registering common typos, takedown requests |
Two points matter here. First, domain hijacking is often the first step of DNS hijacking: an attacker who owns the registrar account simply changes your nameservers. Second, typosquatting needs no break-in at all. Nothing of yours is stolen, but customers can still be fooled.
DNSSEC (a system that digitally signs DNS answers) helps against poisoning. It does not stop someone who logs into your registrar. For a real-world example of attackers changing DNS records at scale, read the CISA advisory AA19-024A on the DNS infrastructure hijacking campaign.
Domain hijacking prevention: the registrar checklist
Do these in order. Menu names differ by registrar, so look in the domain's settings page.
1. Turn on the registrar lock
The registrar lock (also called transfer lock or domain lock) blocks transfers to another registrar. Technically it sets the status clientTransferProhibited. ICANN explains these status codes in plain terms.
The lock blocks transfers away. It does not stop nameserver or DNS changes by someone who is logged in, which is why 2FA and the login email matter just as much.
Check it yourself from a terminal:
whois yourshop.com | grep -i status
You want to see a line like Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited. No terminal? Paste your domain into ICANN Lookup and read the status list.
Some registrars and extensions also offer a registry lock. It adds a manual check (often a phone call) before any change, and it is aimed at high-value domains. It may cost extra or be unavailable for your extension, so ask your registrar.
2. Protect the account with two-factor login
Two-factor authentication (2FA) asks for a second proof after your password. Pick the strongest option your registrar offers:
- A hardware security key, or a passkey.
- An authenticator app (Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, 1Password and similar).
- Text message codes only if nothing else is offered. Phone numbers can be taken over through SIM swapping (a trick that moves your number to the attacker's SIM).
Use a long, unique password from a password manager. Save the backup codes somewhere offline.
3. Lock down the registrar login email
Your registrar login email is the master key. Anyone who controls that inbox can reset your registrar password.
- Use a dedicated address, such as a private mailbox, not
info@oradmin@that five people read. - Host it on a different domain than the one it protects. If
you@yourshop.comis the login foryourshop.com, a hijack also hands over the inbox. That is a loop you do not want. - Put 2FA on that mailbox too.
- Keep the contact details at the registrar current, so renewal and security notices reach a real person.
Offboard people the same day they leave. Agencies and freelancers should get delegated access (most registrars have a 'delegate' or 'share access' feature) instead of your password.
4. Keep auto-renew on and the payment card valid
An expired domain can be grabbed by anyone once it drops. Turn auto-renew on, check the card on file is not about to expire, and consider registering for several years at once. Add a calendar reminder 60 days before expiry as a backstop.
5. Add the extras
- Ask whether your registrar offers an account PIN or extra verification for phone support. Support staff tricked by a caller are a known route in.
- Keep your transfer authorization code (also called an EPP code) private. It is the code needed to move a domain away.
- Switch on change alerts and read them. Every nameserver, contact or lock change should email you.
- Keep your DNS records on file. Export or screenshot the whole DNS zone from your DNS host now. At minimum, save the output of
dig NS yourshop.com +short,dig MX yourshop.com +short,dig A yourshop.com +shortanddig TXT yourshop.com +short. If something changes, you will know what the correct values were. A full export is better, because some records (such as DKIM and DMARC, which protect your email) sit under their own names that a simple dig of the main domain does not show.
Want a quick outside view of your DNS and email setup? The free website security check looks at DNS and email security from the outside, and the email spoofing tool shows whether someone could forge mail from your domain.
What to do in the first hour if your domain is stolen
Speed matters, but order matters more. Work down this list.
- Secure your email first. Take back or lock down the inbox that receives your registrar login and reset emails. If the attacker controls it, resetting the registrar password only hands the account straight back to them. Change the mailbox password, turn on 2FA, sign out other sessions, and remove any forwarding rules you did not set. Then change passwords on hosting, payment tools and your store platform.
- Try to get back into the registrar account. If you can still log in, change the password, sign out all sessions, and re-enable the lock. If you cannot, use the registrar's password reset (now that your email is safe). Once you are in, review and remove unknown delegated users, API keys, saved payment methods, forwarding rules and 2FA devices, and change the account email if it was altered. Otherwise the attacker can walk back in.
- Contact the registrar by phone and by ticket. Say plainly: 'My domain was hijacked and I need an account security hold.' Give your domain, account details and proof of ownership (invoices, old emails, ID).
- Check who has it now. Run
whois yourshop.comor use ICANN Lookup. Note the current registrar, nameservers and status. Take screenshots. - Restore DNS if you can. Set the nameservers and records back to the values you saved earlier.
- Warn people. Tell your team, your host and your payment processor. Post a notice on social channels if customers might land on a fake page. Tell them not to enter logins or card details until you confirm it is fixed.
- Keep evidence. Save emails, timestamps and screenshots. You will need them for the registrar and any police report.
- Escalate if the registrar stalls. Ask the registrar in writing to open an inter-registrar transfer dispute (ICANN's Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy, or TDRP, which is filed by registrars, not by owners), especially if the domain moved to a different registrar. You can also file a complaint about the registrar with ICANN Compliance.
If you also suspect the website itself was altered, see our website hacked guide. Recovery can take days, not minutes, and it is not guaranteed, which is why prevention is worth the 20 minutes.
Where a manual website audit fits
The registrar steps above protect the name. They do not tell you whether the site behind it has weak spots, such as exposed admin pages, missing protections or leaky settings. If you want to know where you stand, our guide to whether your website is hackable is a good starting point.
A Bug Circuit audit does not log into your registrar. It is a manual test of your website by a real person, ending in a written report with each issue, its severity, evidence and fix steps. Fixing is separate: we send a price first. The Essential plan is $49 one-time and covers 1 website with 3 audits to request within one month. It is a focused small-site check, not a multi-week enterprise pentest or a compliance certificate.
Key takeaways
- Domain hijacking means someone takes over your registrar account or registration. It is different from DNS hijacking, DNS poisoning and typosquatting, though it often leads to DNS hijacking.
- Turn on the registrar lock now and confirm it with
whois yourshop.com | grep -i status. Remember the lock only blocks transfers, so 2FA and a protected login email matter just as much. - Use 2FA (a security key or authenticator app) and a dedicated login email on a different domain, also protected with 2FA.
- Keep auto-renew on, keep the card valid, and save your whole DNS zone so you can restore it fast.
- If the domain is stolen, secure your email first, then regain the registrar account, call the registrar, restore DNS, warn people and keep evidence.
When you are ready to check the site itself, a $49 Essential audit gives you a human-written report you can act on. No pressure: the registrar steps above are free and worth doing today either way.
A real human security engineer audits your whole site by hand and sends a full report: every issue, its severity, and the exact fix. From $49, with a 14-day money-back guarantee.
See pricing